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RECENT DECISIONS
The minority view on the degree of care required in elevator cases is that the
instrumentality must be in a reasonably safe condition for the customer's use.
A New York court reasoned that since buildings have other things just as
dangerous, such as boilers and open hatchways, and only reasonable care is
required for them, no exception should be made with regard to elevators, since
all of the dangerous instrumentalities are within the same building. Griffin v.
Manice, 166 N.Y. 188, 198, 59 N.E. 925, 52 L.R.A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630
(1901). Other courts have reasoned that an elevator is not, like a common car-
rier, a servant of the public, but that the relations and duties of an elevator
operator are with a limited number of persons who have contracted with him
for the use of his premises and others who have business with his tenants.
Seaver v. Bradley, 179 Mass. 329, 60 N.E. 795, 88 Am. St. Rep. 384 (1901);
Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 210, 96 N.W. 29 (1903).
The jurisdictions which require the highest degree of care in the operation
of elevators seem to follow the same rule in regard to escalators, reasoning that
there is no difference in principle between the operation of an elevator and an
escalator. Both are installed for the same purpose and the only difference is
in the method of operation. The elevator runs in a perpendicular fashion and
the escalator at an angle of approximately 45 degrees. Both are intended for
the benefit of customers and to induce the customers to visit the establishment
of the owners, the owners profiting from the installation and operation of each.
McBride v. May Departnent Stores, 124 Ohio St. 264, 178 N.E. 12 (1931);
Petrie v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).
Jurisdictions following the minority rule as to elevators apply a like rule as
to escalators, i.e., the operator must use reasonable care to keep in a reasonably
safe condition for customer's use. Richter v. L. Bamberger & Co., 11 N.J. Misc.
229, 165 AtI. 289 (1933). One court reasoned that if the highest degree of care
were required for escalators, there would be in the same building one degree
of care for one mode of elevation and another degree of care for another,
that is, if the plaintiff elected to use the stairs, a degree of care would be
required different from that required if she used the escalator or elevator. The
court could see no reason for these different degrees of care. Stratton v. New-
berry Co., 117 Conn. 522, 169 Atl. 56 (1933).
JOSEPH ZILBER
Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Intervention of a Third Party.-Action for dam-
ages, arising out of the alleged negligent operation of the defendant's power
plant, was brought by a meat packing company. The plaintiff operated two elec-
tric compressors for the manufacture of ice. The electric power, supplied by
the defendant power company, failed. When the current was restored, the
motors of the two compressors began to burn. The preponderance of evidence
indicated that the fire was caused by the delivery, to the electric motors, of a
"1single phase current" rather than a "three phase current." The "single phasing"
was caused by the collision of an automobile with one of the defendant com-
pany's poles. The defendant obtained a judgment on a directed verdict.
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
it was entitled to a full and complete explanation of the cause of the fire, but
that no such explanation had been offered. Judgment held, reversed and the cause
remanded for a new trial, but only on the ground that there had been a sufficient
conflict of evidence to prevent a directed verdict. The federal court refused to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the intervention of a third party
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had been shown. Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington Water Power C., 99 F.
(2d) 614 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938).
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based upon the assumption that the
defendant, having control of the instrument causing the injury, has a superior
knowledge or at least more adequate means of determining what caused the
accident. The doctrine is applied where (1) the instrumentality causing the in-
jury is in the exclusive control of the defendant, (2) the circumstances attend-
ing the accident carry a strong probability of negligence on the part of the
defendant, (3) the cause is otherwise unknown, and (4) the accident probably
would not have happened if the defendant had exercised ordinary care. Gritsch
v. Pickwick, 131 Cal. App. 794, 22 P. (2d) 554 (1933). The hypothesis upon which
the inference of negligence is founded is that the plaintiff has no knowledge of
what caused the accident since the instrumentality was solely within the con-
trol of the defendant. Klenzendorf v. Shasta Union High School, 4 Cal. App.
(2d) 164, 40 P. (2d) 878 (1935).
In Idaho, where the instant case arose, the court follows the majority inter-
pretation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, namely that a sufficient inference
of negligence is created to take the case to the jury. The jury, however, is not
compelled to find the defendant negligent. Ryan v. George L. Lilley Co., 121
Conn. 26, 183 Atl. 2 (1936); Garrett v. M. McDonough Co. (Mass. 1937)
7 N.E. (2d) 417; Rost v. Roberts, 180 Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923).
Under this interpretation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is strictly evidentiary
and supplies, not a presumption of negligence, but rather evidence of negligence
upon which a recovery may be had. Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 287 Fed. 797
(U.S.C.C.A., N.J., 1923). There is, therefore, no shift in the burden of proof.
Mercer v. Omaha & C. B. St. R. Co., 180 Neb. 532, 188 N.W. 296 (1922). There
is only a justification of a finding by the jury that the defendant was negligent.
Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Co., 222 Ky. 736, 2 S.W. (2d) 374 (1928). The in-
ference of negligence, even in the face of rebutting evidence, may be considered
independently by the jury. Covington v. James, 214 N.C. 71, 197 S.E. 701
(1938).
A very small minority holds that upon a showing of a res ipsa loquitur case,
there is a shift of the burden of proof to the defendant. Maltz v. Carter, 311 Pa.
550, 166 Atl. 852 (1933). Under the latter view the defendant must offer an
explanation which shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident
was not chargeable to his negligence. Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash.
34, 17 P. (2d) 631 (1933).
An intermediate view holds that the burden of proof does not shift in a
res ipsa loquitur case, but the burden of going forward with the evidence does.
That is, the plaintiff gets the benefit not merely of a permissible inference of
negligence, but of true legal presumption, or required inference, compelling the
defendant to introduce rebuttal evidence. Cavaretta v. Universal Film Exchange
Inc., 182 So. 135 (1938).
Within the three foregoing interpretations of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, there is a second and distinct conflict of opinion. Under the majority rule,
the doctrine is not at all applicable if it can be shown that (1) the defendant
does not have control of the premises or the operation of the instrumentality,
or (2) there is a division of responsibility. Laurent v. United Fuel Gas Co., 101
W.Va. 499, 133 S.E. 116 (1926). Though most often included in the two fore-
going elements, a third element, possession of the instrumentality, is sometimes
expressly required. Winfree v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Lebanon, 19 Tenn.
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App. 144, 83 S.W. (2d) 903 (1935). Similar decisions have been rendered in
Brunell v. Mountain State Power Co., 81 F. (2d) 205 (1936); Sutcliffe v. Fort
Dodge Gas and Electric Co., 218 Iowa 1386, 257 N.W. 406 (1935); Dittert v.
Fisher, 148 Ore. 366, 36 P. (2d) 592 (1934) ; Jones v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
185 La. 1067, 167 So. 833 (1936).
While the great weight of authority requires that the instrumentality be under
the control of the defendant, a minority permits the intervention of a third
party. Those jurisdictions permitting the intervention of a third party do so
only under limited circumstances. The doctrine has been held to be applicable
even though the injury was received in a collision between a trolley car and a
motor truck. Thus, though the defendant was not in full control of the instru-
mentality causing the injury, the doctrine was held applicable. Plumb v. Rich-
-mond Light and R. R. Co., 233 N.Y. 285, 135 N.E. 504, 25 A.L.R. 685 (1922).
Other New York cases, not involving carriers, refused to permit the use of the
doctrine where a third party intervened. In Slater v. Barnes, 241 N.Y. 284, 149
N.E. 859 (1926), the plaintiff sought damages for injuries received from falling
plaster. It was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur required the instru-
mentality producing the injury to be within the exclusive possession of the
defendant. The doctrine was held to be inapplicable where some of the agencies
contributing to the injury were outside the control of the defendant. Murray v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 236 App. Div. 477, 260 N.Y.S. 132 (1932).
It would appear, therefore, that any deviation from the weight of authority
is to be found only in cases involving common carriers or similar agencies upon
which is placed a greater responsibility to protect the safety of the public. How-
ever, this deviation from the rule is a concession rather than well defined policy
since in Alexander v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 128 N.Y. 13, 27 N.E. 950
(1891), the court refused to apply the doctrine in a collision between a street
car and a wagon.
Wisconsin follows the majority rule that proof of the intervention of a third
party prevents the application of the doctrine. Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 385, 172
N.W. 736 (1919); Carroll v. Chicago B. & NV. R. Co., 99 Wis. 399, 75 N.W. 176
(1898).
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